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Contextuality is the failure of “local” probabilistic
models to become global ones. In this paper we
introduce the notions of measurable fibre bundles,
probability fibre bundles, and sample fibre bundle which
capture and make precise the former statement. The
central notions of contextuality are discussed under
this formalism, examples worked out, and some new
aspects pointed out.
1. Outlook and Motivations
Many Escher images, like Waterfall or Ascending and
Descending [1] illustrate vividly the problemof contextuality.
Each piece of the image is totally consistent, the
pieces even connect smoothly, however, when we try
to glue them all together some “obstruction” appears.
Mathematically, the notion of gluing pieces together
is also present. Probably, the best known example are
differential surfaces, where each piece is identified with an
open set of the Euclidean plane R2, but when the pieces
are glued together, they can make very different objects
like a sphere, a torus or even some objects which do
not fit in R3, like the Klein Bottle [2]. Another example
are vector bundles. If one uses a differentiable manifold
(the d-dimensional analogue of diferentiable surfaces),
M , as the basis space and attach to each point p∈
M a vector space, Vp, with some rule about how to
connect the vectors of neighbour points, one gets another
differentiable manifold, E, with points given by pairs
(p, v), with p∈M and v ∈ Vp. Well known to many
physicists and essential for differential geometers is the
example of the tangent bundle, TM , when Vp = TpM , the
tangent space ofM on p, where Lagrangian mechanics is
developed [3].
c© The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/, which permits unrestricted use, provided the original author and
source are credited.
2rs
ta
.ro
ya
ls
o
c
ie
ty
p
u
b
lis
h
in
g
.o
rg
P
h
il.
T
ra
n
s
.
R
.
S
o
c
.
A
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
..................................................................
Probability theory, however, is developed over the concept of a single σ-algebra, where all
the relevant events are defined. This is very natural, classically, where given two events A and
B, it also makes sense to consider the event A ∩B, logically connected to the conjunction of the
conditions forA andB. It inherently brings the notion of a “global order” and that images like the
ones from Escher are really impossible in our world. The notion of contextuality brings another
status to those “impossible figures” [4]. Moreover, the notion of quantum contextuality [5] says
that those impossible figures somehow appear in Nature.
In this contribution we develop the notions of measurable bundle and probability bundle as
“Escherian” generalisations of the basic notions of measurable space and probability space, where
Kolmogorovian probability theory is developed [6]. In other words, we set the basis for the
development of a probability theory where topology plays a crucial rôle.
Despite being inspired by quantum theory, the notions developed here are totally independent
of it. The examples worked out here are the most simple, yet surprising ones, and do not demand
any knowledge of quantum theory. After reviewing (in sec. 2) the basic notions of probability
theorywhichwe are generalising,we introduce the central notions of contextuality and the central
objects of our contribution in sec. 3. The fibre bundle approach to contextuality is developed
in sec. 4, with examples and the translations of Fine-Abramsky-Brandeburger theorem for
characterisation of contextuality and Budroni-Morchio results on scenarios with no contextuality
to this language. The notion of contextuality subscenarios guide the sec. 5, emphasising evenmore
the connection of contextuality and topology. Connections to other approaches are discussed in
sec. 6, while some more speculative points are raised in sec. 7 before the closing in sec. 8.
2. Classical Probability Theory in a nutshell
(a) The basic notions
A famous dictum attributed to M. Kac say that probability theory is measure theory with a soul.
This section is to fix concepts and notations for sample spaces, measurable spaces and probability
spaces. For a deeper introduction, we recommend ref. [6], among many other textbooks. The
central notion is
Definition 2.1. Given a set S, a σ-algebra over S, denoted Σ, is a collection of subsets of S with ∅ ∈Σ,
closed under complementation and countable unions.
Remark 2.2. The examples to be raised will use finite sets S. However, some of the questions and the
central target of generalising usual probability theory demand the more general definition.
Definition 2.3. Ameasurable space is a pair (Ω,Σ), where Ω is a set and Σ a σ-algebra on it. The set
Ω is called the sample space.
The next step is to measure the sets in Σ. This demands the notion of a measure. We will jump
straight to the definition of probability measure:
Definition 2.4. A probability measure, or simply a probability, on a measurable space (Ω,Σ) is a
function µ :Σ −→ [0, 1] such that
• µ (∅) = 0;
• If Ai are pairwise disjoint sets in Σ, then
1 µ
(⋃
i
Ai
)
=
∑
i
µ (Ai);
• µ (Ω) = 1.
1Again, this property is demanded on all countable unions and countable sums.
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The triple (Ω,Σ, µ) is called a probability space.
Another important notion in what follows is that if we fix a sample space Ω, the σ-algebras on
it obey a partial order coming from inclusion:
Definition 2.5. Given two σ-algebras, Σ and Σ′, over the same set we say that Σ is a coarse graining
of Σ′, or that Σ′ refines Σ if Σ ⊆Σ′.
Intuitively, this means that any atom of Σ can be obtained as a (countable) union of atoms of
Σ′.
(b) The simplest case and its geometry
Once one is concerned with a finite collection of (classical) random variables, X = {Xi}, each of
them taking values in finite sets Si, there is a minimal and sufficient (Boolean) σ-algebra to hold
such situation. For only one variable, taking values in the finite set S, the powerset, P (S), plays
this rôle. In other words, one can identify S with the sample spaceΩ and use the measurable space
(S,P (S)). For the finite set of variables,
Σ =
∏
X
P (Si) . (2.1)
Here,
∏
is taken as the σ-algebra product, analogous to the set-theoretical Cartesian product.
Interestingly, the simple set-theoretical identification
∏
P (Si)≡P (
∏
Si) brings something that
will have deep consequences when contextuality comes to play: classically, we could change this
set of random variables for just one random variable,X , taking values in
∏
Si. Anticipating some
notions (see Definition 3.8), this means that all (classical) random variables are jointly realisable.
Whenever one wants to attach a probability measure to a σ-algebra P (S), it is necessary and
sufficient to attach a non-negative value p (s) for each s∈ S, such that
∑
S p (s) = 1. This brings a
very basic, concrete, and geometrical notion:
Definition 2.6. Given a finite set, S, the canonical vectors of R|S| are the vertices of the probability
simplex. The probability simplex is the convex hull of its vertices.
Indeed, this means that the usual picture of a segment, a triangle, a tetrahedron, . . . , generalises
and that the only important feature of S is its cardinality. Each point in the simplex works as a
probabilistic model for the set of variables studied and this is a bijection.
(c) An Ontology for Classical Probability Theory
Classical probability theory, as introduced by Kolmogorov, allows for a very natural ontology. It
is, by nomeans, necessary, and the Occam’s razormust be the reason for its (complete?) absence in
textbooks. The sample space, Ω, can be considered as an ontological space, where every question
has an answer, or, equivalently, every property is well defined. Those questions or properties are
given by random variables, each of them assuming well defined values for each point ω ∈Ω.
Their randomness only enters in the game under the idea that ω is unknown (or, “hidden”). To
some sense, the epistemological space is given by Σ, or by some coarsening Σ′ ⊂Σ, such that all
random variables defined in the model has measurable sets attached to each possible value.
As already stated, such ontology is unnecessary. However, it can be considered as the classical
trait to be consistent with such ontology. It is under this paradigm that space shuttles are sent to
Mars, that GPS localises mobiles up to small uncertainties, and even classical statistical mechanics
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was developed2. Contextuality appears whenever it fails. This is usually from where adjectives
like weird, counterintuitive, or paradoxical come from.
3. Central Definitions
(a) Measurements
Themost primitive notion of measurement is that it gives results. This is what wewill use in order
to characterise them:
Definition 3.1. Ameasurement,M, is a (countable3) set of labels for the possible results.
Definition 3.2. Given a measurement,M, a realisation in a measurable space (Ω,Σ) is a partition of Ω
into elements of Σ subordinated toM, i.e.: with elements indexed by the measurement outcomes.
Remark 3.3. At this level, all (finite) measurements are realisable. Just consider Ω =M, as sets, and
Σ =P (Ω).
Remark 3.4. Equivalently, one can define a realisation of M in (Ω,Σ) as a measurable function m :
(Ω,Σ)→ (M,P (M)).
Remark 3.5. Note that by this definition, whenever a measurement is done, one and only one of the
outcomes appear. This is consistent with the notion of exclusive outcomes.
Whenever the measurable space is upgraded to a probability space, a realisation ofM defines
probabilities for all its outcomes:
Definition 3.6. Given a measurementM with a realisation in (Ω,Σ), if (Ω,Σ, µ) is a probability space,
then µ is a (probability)measure forM.
Remark 3.7. If we go along with remark 3.4, we can also see that pushing forward µ along m gives a
(probability) measure on (M,P (M)).
Before jumping into contextuality, we need to workout the notions related to joint
measurability.
Definition 3.8. Given two measurements, M and N , the joint measurement is given by M∧N =
M×N (as sets). A joint realisation in a measurable space (Ω,Σ) is a partition of Ω into elements of Σ
subordinated toM∧N . If (Ω,Σ, µ) is a probability space, then µ is a joint (probability) measure for
M andN .
Remark 3.9. If M is realised in (Ω,Σ) and N is realised in
(
Ω′, Σ′
)
, then M∧N is realised
in (Ω,Σ)×
(
Ω′, Σ′
)
. This antecipates that the central notion of contextuality does not appear when
considering only two measurements. This very simple observation has deep consequences: contextuality
can never appear on trivial topologies [9].
Definition 3.10. Given a setM and a partition P ofM into disjoint nonempty subsets, the measurement
P associated to P is a coarse graining of the measurementM associated toM .
2Actually, it was such a completion that Einstein, Podolsky, andRosenwere looking for in their criticism to quantum theory [7]
and this is what Bell rules out with his inequalities [8].
3For measurements with uncountable possible results some adaptations will be necessary, but in this contribution we want
to keep things simple.
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Definition 3.11. Given a joint measurement M∧N , the measurements M and N are called its
marginal measurements.
Lemma 3.1. Given a joint measurementM∧N , the marginal measurements can be identified with coarse
grainings of the joint measurement.
Proof. Given the Cartesian product M×N , the partition m×N for M×N is naturally
identified with the setM, bym×N 7−→m. Analogously, for the partitionM× n.
This leads to another very important relation between measurements:
Definition 3.12. MeasurementsM andN are compatible iff there exist a common coarse graining, from
which both can be obtained as marginals.
Remark 3.13. Given two measurements and no other restriction, one can always define the joint
measurement. The strength of the notion of compatibility only shows up when we work on some nontrivial
contextuality scenario, which brings us to the next subsection.
(b) Contextuality
Now we set the stage for the questions we are treating. The central ingredient is a collection, X ,
of possible measurements,Mk , some of them can be compatible, while other not.
Definition 3.14. Given a collection of measurements, X , a context for the measurement M∈X is a
subset C ⊂X withM∈C in which all measurements are compatible. A maximal context forM∈X ,
C, is a context that can not be enlarged by including elements of X . In other words, if C is a maximal
context in X , for anyN ∈X \ C there is someM′ ∈C incompatible withN .
As already stated, in this construction, compatibility is not an inherent property of a set of
measurements. This demands the central notion of scenarios:
Definition 3.15. A measurement scenario, or a contextuality scenario, or a compatibility scenario
(which we will call simply a scenario) is given by a pair (X ,C), where X is a collection of measurements
and C a compatibility cover for X . A compatibility cover, C, for the measurement collection X is a
collection of maximal contexts in X such that eachM∈X belongs to at least one context in C.
Remark 3.16. The choice of demanding maximal contexts for the cover is technical. One great advantage
is economy when describing scenarios. The other possible choice would be to impose that whenever C ∈ C,
than C′ ∈ C for every C′ ⊂C. The later has the topological advantage of making simplicial complexes
explicit.
In usual experiments, for each context every measurements in the context can be performed
and the results sampled allowing the inference of someprobability distribution for the joint results
of the measurements in each context.
Definition 3.17. Given a scenario (X , C), an empirical model, E , is the association of each context
C ∈ C to a probability distribution of the results of the measurements in C, i.e.: pC :
∏
M∈CM→R,
with pc (m)≥ 0 and
∑
pc (m) = 1.
Given an empirical model (also called a behaviour), it also defines probability distributions for
subsets of the (maximal) contexts, via marginalisation. If S ⊂C, then pCS :
∏
M∈SM→R is given
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by
p
C
S (s) =
∑
m|S=s
pC (m) , (3.1)
wherem|S = smeans that the restriction
4 of the outcomesm for the measurements in C to those
on S gives the respective outcomes s.
One important condition in those problems is the following:
Condition 3.2. If two contexts, C and C′, overlap, themarginal condition demands pCC∩C′ = p
C′
C∩C′ .
Whenever this condition holds, we may drop the symbol from the context out and work with
pC∩C′ . In other words, this is the necessary condition for a probability distribution to be defined
on C ∩ C′, and, consequently, in all of its subsets.
Definition 3.18. An empirical model, E , in a scenario, (X , C), is non-disturbing if for every C,C′ ∈ C
the marginal condition 3.2 holds.
After defining a non-contextual model, let us present two different definitions for an empirical
model to be non contextual. These definitions are shown equivalent by the Fine-Abramsky-
Brandenburger Theorem [10,11].
Definition 3.19. Given a scenario, (X , C), a non-contextual model is a collection of probability
distributions pΛM :M× Λ→R, with p
Λ
M (m,λ)≥ 0 and
∑
m∈M
p
Λ
M (m,λ) = p
Λ (λ), for allM∈X and
λ∈Λ, such that for every C ∈ C,
pC (m) =
∑
λ∈Λ
∏
M∈C
p
Λ
M (m,λ) . (3.2)
Remark 3.20. The existence of a non-contextual model can be read as the existence of a probability space(
Λ, Υ, pΛ
)
from which one can obtain independent joint probabilities for each random variable in the
scenario and lambda. Following the discussion in subsection 2.(c), this is consistent with the idea that λ
determines5 the outcome of each random variable and correlations are established since one cannot access
the variable λ. This is essentially the reasoning for such additional (latent, in the language of causal
structures [12]) variable λ be usually referred to as hidden.
Definition 3.21. An empirical model, E , is non contextual by model if it can be obtained from a non-
contextual model.
Definition 3.22. An emprical model, E , is non contextual by marginals if there is a joint probability
distribution pX :
∏
M∈X →R such that for all C ∈ C, pC = p
X
C .
As already anticipated:
Theorem 3.3 (Fine, Abramsky, Brandenburger). An empirical model, E , is non contextual by model
if, and only if, it is non contextual by marginals.
Given this equivalence, whenever the distinction is irrelevant we will just call those empirical
models non contextual. A proof can be made very constructive: given a non-contextual model,
4Some readersmay considermore elegant to consider a projectionpi :m 7→ s and the sum runs over the fibre over s, pi−1 (s).
The same projection can also be used to say that the marginal pC
S
is the result of pushing forward pC through pi.
5Explicitly, given a model (3.2), fixing λ only determines conditional probabilities pM (m|λ), however, as again those
are classical probabilities, this means that we could refine more and obtain
(
Λ′, Υ ′, pΛ
′
)
such that all those conditional
probabilities be deterministic.
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by multiplying all pΛM and then marginalising on Λ, one obtains the collective distribution. On
the other way around, the collective distribution can always be made as a convex combination
of deterministic distributions, which assign deterministic values for each random variable; one
simply needs to use the variables of the convex combination to act as λ. We hope our work will
shed some new light on this important result, by stressing the rôle played by topology in it.
(c) Measurable Fibre Bundles
Now we start to glue concepts. Given a scenario, (X ,C), by construction for each C ∈ C, one can
choose a measurable space
(
ΩC , ΣC
)
which realises the joint measurement
∧
M∈C
M. EachM∈
C gives a partition of ΣC and defines a coarsening of ΣC , which we will denote ΣCM. Whenever
C ∩ C′ 6= ∅, the joint measurement of all elements of C ∩ C′ will define the coarsenings ΣCC∩C′
and ΣC
′
C∩C′ . The labelling given by such coarsening defines a bijection Σ
C
C∩C′↔Σ
C′
C∩C′ . By
identifying the sets related by such bijections, we have an abstract σ-algebra for eachM∈X given
by the equivalence class of all ΣCM, for all C ∋M, which we denote by ΣM. This construction
prepares the following:
Definition 3.23. Given a scenario (X , C), a Measurable Fibre Bundle is the attachment of a
measurable space
(
ΩC , ΣC
)
to each context. WheneverC ∩ C′ 6= ∅, the identificationΣCC∩C′↔Σ
C′
C∩C′
is considered, leading to the fibre over the measurementM, ΣM. The projection, pi, is defined only for
the sets S ∈ΣC associated to a set in ΣCM. Naturally, in those cases pi (S) =M.
It is quite important to note that this is done on the level of the σ-algebra but not necessarily
on the level of the sample space. Let us discuss a situation where one can go up until the level of
sample spaces.
Definition 3.24. Ameasurable fibre bundle,
(
ΩC , ΣC
)
for a scenario, (X ,C) is a Sample Fibre Bundle
if the bijections ΣCC∩C′↔Σ
C′
C∩C′ can consistently be obtained from relations Ω
C ↔ΩC
′
.
Remark 3.25. It is important to note that those relations are not necessarily functions, since multiple
associations are allowed in both directions, however, their images must generate partitions subordinated to
C ∩ C′.
Example 3.26. Given a scenario, (X , C), for eachM∈X choose a measurable space,
(
ΩM, ΣM
)
. For
each C ∈ C, take (
Ω
C
, Σ
C
)
=
∏
M∈C
(
Ω
M
, Σ
M
)
. (3.3)
WheneverM∈C ∩ C′, the identificationΣCC∩C′↔Σ
C′
C∩C′ must fix theΣ
M component in the product.
This can be naturally extended to ΩM, also acting as the identity map on it. The Measurable Bundle just
constructed is a Sample Bundle.
The example above explores one very important characteristic of fibre bundles: it is piecewise
a product6. However, there is a little bit more: each
(
ΩC , ΣC
)
is actually a restriction of a global
product:
(Ω,Σ) =
∏
M∈X
(
Ω
M
, Σ
M
)
. (3.4)
In this sense, those fibre bundles are trivial. A nontrivial example comes from the n−cycle
scenario, bearing in mind the celebrated Möbius strip:
6The best mathematical word is locally, but we will not use it here in order to avoid any misunderstanding related to the
locality concept of Bell.
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Example 3.27. Consider a dychothomic n-cycle scenario, (X , C), where X = {M0,M1, . . . ,Mn−1},
each Mi a binary set, and C = {Ci}i=0,...,n−1, with Ci = {Mi,Mi+1}, and addition understood
modulo n. For each Mi, take Ω
Mi = [−1, 1] and Borel sets as ΣMi . For each Ci, take
(
ΩCi , ΣCi
)
=(
ΩMi , ΣMi
)
×
(
ΩMi+1 , ΣMi+1
)
and, as identifications Ωi↔Ωi+1 take identity functions ωi 7→
ωi+1 for all, but one values of i, for which, ωi 7→ −ωi+1 is used. Since those identifications extend to Borel
sets, here we have explictly constructed a Sample Bundle.
In contrast to example 3.26, in example 3.27 we have nontrivial bundles.
Remark 3.28. It is important to recognise that for all values of c 6= 0, the piecewise constant function
i 7→ c fails to generate a global function. On the other hand, the constant function i 7→ 0 is globally defined
and this has interesting consequences to which we shall come back latter on.
(d) Probability Fibre Bundles
Now we will include probabilities and empirical models in our discussion. The measurable
bundles of subsection (c) will receive probability measures in each fibre and the marginal
condition will receive a new interpretation.
The construction specialises the notion of measurable bundle. Given a scenario (X , C), we
may attach a probability space to each context:
(
ΩC , ΣC , µC
)
. Whenever C ∩ C′ 6= ∅, we want
not only to have the identification ΣCC∩C′↔Σ
C′
C∩C′ , but also to define a probability measure on
it. This is exactly the marginal condition 3.2 applied to the restrictions µCC∩C′ and µ
C′
C∩C′ .
Definition 3.29. Given a scenario (X , C), a Probability Fibre Bundle is the attachment of a probability
space
(
ΩC , ΣC , µC
)
to each context. Whenever C ∩ C′ 6= ∅, the identification ΣCC∩C′↔Σ
C′
C∩C′ is
considered and the marginal condition µCC∩C′ = µ
C′
C∩C′ is demanded, leading to the fibre over the
measurement M, (ΣM, µM). The projection, pi, is defined only for the sets S ∈Σ
C associated to a set
in ΣCM. Naturally, in those cases, pi (S, µM (S)) =M.
The definition of Probability Fibre Bundles, 3.29, should be compared to the definition of
Empirical Model, 3.17. The latter gives the necessary data to the former, whenever the marginal
condition holds for all overlapping contexts. The problem can be stated as this: given a non-
disturbing empirical model on a measurement scenario (X , C), one can construct a probability
fibre bundle over the same scenario. Two questions appear: can we upgrade such a bundle to a
sample fibre bundle? If so, is this bundle trivial?
To close this section, let us point out another aspect. In subsection 2.(b) we introduced the
probability simplex. For scenarios with finite contexts of finite measurements, each context
generates a probability simplex. Whenever we condition on any (subset) of the measurements in
the context, we obtain a smaller simplex, related to the remaining measurements. If we consider
the intersection of two contexts, there is no meaning in conditioning on incompatible variables.
However, the marginals are meaningful and they represent coarse grainings which should, then,
be identifiable. What is the geometry/topology behind such identifications and, specially, coming
from such identifications over a given scenario?
4. Fibre Bundle approach to Contextuality
Now we have everything set and can discuss in more details how contextuality manifests in
those objects. The central result is the translation of Fine-Abramsky-Brandeburguer Theorem
into the question of triviality of a Probability Fibre Bundle. This brings to the arena questions on
extensions and obstructions, i.e.: on possibilities and impossibilities. It also shows the centrality
of the so far ignored notion of subscenarios, which we shall discuss on section 5.
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(a) An Example-Oriented Discussion
The first thing to be understood is the generalisation of the situation shown in subsection 2.(b).
There, for a finite collection of finite sets, the sample space could be identified with the atoms of
the σ-algebra of the problem. This can be put together with example 3.26 to show that any finite
scenario allows for a trivial sample bundle. Let us discuss another example of non-trivial sample
bundle.
Example 4.1 (Hollow Triangle). Consider the scenario (X , C) given by
X = {Ma,Mb,Mc} ,
C = {{Ma,Mb} , {Mb,Mc} , {Mc,Ma}} ,
(4.1a)
withMa = {↑, ↓},Mb = {0, 1}, andMc = {g, r}. For each context take the minimal measurable space(
Ω
ab
, Σ
ab
)
= (Ma ×Mb,P (Ma ×Mb)) ,(
Ω
bc
, Σ
bc
)
= (Mb ×Mc,P (Mb ×Mc)) ,(
Ω
ca
, Σ
ca)= (Mc ×Ma,P (Mc ×Ma)) .
(4.1b)
Now we need the coarse graining in order to define the identifications. Here we will introduce contextuality,
which can be seen as a twist (topologically saying): for each context, the first variable will have the “natural”
coarse graining, while the second will be “inverted”. Explicitly:
Ω
ab
a = {↑= {(↑, 0) , (↑, 1)} , ↓= {(↓, 0) , (↓, 1)}} ,
Ω
ab
b = {0= {(↑, 1) , (↓, 1)} , 1= {(↑, 0) , (↓, 0)}} ,
Ω
bc
b = {0= {(0, g) , (0, r)} , 1= {(1, g) , (1, r)}} ,
Ω
bc
c = {g= {(0, r) , (1, r)} , r= {(0, g) , (1, g)}} ,
Ω
ca
c = {g= {(g, ↑) , (g, ↓)} , r= {(r, ↑) , (r, ↓)}} ,
Ω
ca
a = {↑= {(g, ↓) , (r, ↓)} , ↓= {(g, ↑) , (r, ↑)}} .
(4.1c)
This defines a non-trivial sample bundle. We shall keep this notation that makes contextuality and the
twist explicit, by using such minimal construction where ΣC =P
(
ΩC
)
and the coarse grainings are
projections or “twisted projections”; but in order to not consider this as artificially made, the reader should
also consider the equivalent case where ΩCS is a binary set with labels unrelated to the elements of Ω
C .
To see how contextuality is deeply related to such bundle, we should interpret what a choice like (↑, 1, g)
would mean in terms of the measurements. In the context {Ma,Mb} this implies outcomes (↑, 0), while
in the context {Mb,Mc} this implies (1, r), which already shows the contextuality ofMb. Accordingly,
for the context {Mc,Ma} this implies (g, ↓), making clear that those “global assignments” which try to
define values for all measurements can exhibit contextuality. Generalising the choice made, any assignment
(a, b, c) would imply opposite answers for each measurement on its two contexts.
This example generalises for any size, n, of the cycle. As we shall see later on, there is a parity
issue decisive in order to distinguish intrinsic contextuality from removable contextuality.
A very beautiful phenomenon shows up when building probability bundles over sample
bundles like the one in example 4.1. In those examples, contextuality is manifest in its stronger
case: disturbance. Suppose one can characterise that a “state” (a, b, c) was prepared. Then, when
measuringMa, the result a would imply the context (Ma,Mb), while the result a¯ would imply
the context (Mc,Ma).
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Example 4.2. Consider the Hollow Triangle scenario of example 4.1 and the following empirical model on
it:
pab (↑, 1) =
1
2
= pab (↓, 0) ,
pbc (0, r) =
1
2
= pbc (1, g) ,
pca (g, ↓) =
1
2
= pca (r, ↑) ,
(4.2)
with all other probabilities null. First, by checking the marginals, see that this empirical model is
nondisturbing. Now, one can easily check that this model can be considered as a balanced convex
combination of the two “global assignments”: (↑, 0, g) and (↓, 1, r). Other three equally interesting sample
bundle realisations of (contextual) probability bundles are from the other combinations of (a, b, c) with(
a¯, b¯, c¯
)
. Topologically, those non-disturbing empirical models are related to the null constant function of
remark 3.28.
We have seen two examples of sample bundles, one trivial, one not, and some probability
bundles which realise given empirical models.
(b) Making Topology (more) Explicit
The central question now appears: given a scenario, can all empirical models be obtained as trivial
probability bundles? The interesting answer is: only the non-contextual ones! That is how Fine-
Abramsky-Brandenburger Theorem 3.3 translates here:
Theorem 4.1 (Fibre Budle version of Fine-Abramsky-Brandenburger). Given a scenario, (X , C), an
empirical model can be realised as a trivial probability bundle iff the model is non contextual.
Proof. If the empirical model can be realised as a trivial probability bundle, then the sample
bundle can be extended to a product bundle and the model is non contextual by marginals.
If the empirical model, E , is non contextual there is a global probability distribution for the
measurements inX and this is an empiricalmodel E˜ in the scenario (X ,X ), giving a trivial bundle
whose restriction to (X , C) gives a trivial probability bundle realising E .
In the proof above we already used one instance of a very important topological result: not
all basis (in our case, scenarios) can support non-trivial bundles7. This explains and extends a lot
the remark 3.9, and put in a topologically broader context the result on ref. [9]. This deserves a
little more discussion. In a very lousy way, we could say that trivial basis can only generate trivial
bundles. To make it precise, one should define what a trivial basis mean. One very good example
of “trivial basis”’ is any contractible hypergraph. Since a cycle always make a (hyper-)graph non-
contractible, in graph language, the trivial basis/scenarios are trees.
Corollary 4.2 (Budroni-Morchio). If a scenario (X , C) is free of cycles, than it is also free of contextuality.
Topologically, cycles allow for non-trivial homology8. In refs. [13–16], the authors point out
the influence of cohomology in contextuality and nonlocality. We hope this bundle approach will
reforce this relation. As characterised in Thm. 4.1, the central question in contextuality is about
extending a probability fibre bundle into a product one. In topology, it is usual to work with
obstructions, e.g.: a nontrivial homology class implies the nontriviality of some bundle and forbids
such extension. In this sense, a nontrivial first homology group says that a scenario allows for
contextuality, while a nontrivial cohomology class is a way of witnessing contextuality [13–16].
7In the proof we explicitly use that a trivial scenario (X ,X ) supports only trivial bundles.
8They are closed “curves” which are not boundaries.
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(c) Some comments on models
It is interesting to come back to the example of the Hollow Triangle, 4.1, and its generalisations
for the n-cycle. We naturally should contrast it with the product bundle, example 3.26, build on
the same scenario. A very natural question is: are there other interesting sample bundles in this
scenario? The answer is: essentially no! One could guess: the product bundle has no twist while
in example 4.1 we made three twists; what about one or two twists? Interestingly, these cases
correspond to relabelings of the previous two cases: if we take the product bundle but “flip” one
of its variables, it will generate a bundle with two twists, which, however, is something we can
call removable contextuality. Such a bundle is not explicitly a product, but it is isomorphic to one,
so it can not support contextuality. Analogously, if we flip on variable from the example 4.1, we
will “eliminate two flips”, but we still get a non-trivial bundle, as one should guess.
Another interesting point to call is that while trivial sample bundles allow for “realistic
models” and classical interpretations, those non-trivial sample bundles can be considered as
“realistic” models for “classical” interpretations on topologically richer ontological spaces9.
5. Contextuality Subscenarios
When we interpret noncontextuality as the possibility of describing an empirical model using
a trivial probability bundle, i.e.: as an extension problem, another concept pops up: what about
other extensions? In order to make this question more precise, we need a partial order relation for
scenarios:
Definition 5.1. A scenario
(
X ′, C′
)
is a subscenario of (X , C) if X ′ ⊆X and C′ ≤ C, where this last
condition means that for every C′ ∈ C′ there is C ∈ C such that C′ ⊆C.
We will denote
(
X ′, C′
)
 (X ,C) when
(
X ′, C′
)
be a subscenario of (X , C).
Remark 5.2. The classical scenarios are (X ,X ), for any X , and for every scenario it is true that (X , C)
(X ,X ).
There are two canonical ways of creating subscenarios, and any subscenario can be obtained
using any or both of them combined.
Definition 5.3.
(
X ′, C′
)
 (X ,C) is an induced subscenario if C′ = C ⊓ P
(
X ′
)
, where this last symbol
is used in the sense that C′ ∈ C ⊓ P
(
X ′
)
iff one of two situations happen: either C′ ∈ C ∩ P
(
X ′
)
or
C′ = C˜|X′ for some C˜ ∈ C.
Definition 5.4.
(
X ′, C′
)
 (X , C) is a (context-)restricted subscenario if X ′ =X .
By remark 5.2, every scenario is a context-restricted subscenario of the classical scenario for
measurements X .
Definition 3.22 can now be extended:
Definition 5.5. Given
(
X ′, C′
)
 (X , C), an empirical model E ′ in the scenario
(
X ′, C′
)
extends to the
scenario (X ,C) if there is an empirical model E in (X , C) such that for all C′ ∈ C′, pEC′ = p
E
′
C′ .
Simply putting those definitions together one gets:
Theorem 5.1. An empirical model E in (X , C) is noncontextual iff it extends to the classical scenario
(X ,X ).
9Again, no one has to adhere to such “ontology”, neither the author. But is seems very beautiful and deserves more study, at
least from the mathematical viewpoint.
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A beautiful mathematical structure appears when we build a sequence of nested scenarios,
and ask about the possible extensions:
Definition 5.6. A sequence of scenarios is an ordered collection of scenarios
{
(X , C)i
}
where (X , C)i 
(X ,C)i+1. A sequence of scenarios is complete if in every step (X , C)i is a proper subscenario of
(X ,C)i+1 such that there is no proper subscenario in between them.
This notion of sequence of scenarios allows for growing sets of questions, but a central question
comes for sequences of the form
(X , C)≺ . . .≺ (X , C)i ≺ . . .≺ (X ,X ), (5.1)
i.e.: a strictly increasing sequence that finishes on the classical scenario for the same set of
measurements. A very simple result is:
Theorem 5.2. If an empirical model in (X , C) is noncontextual, then it extends to all elements of the
sequence (5.1).
The beautiful question comes: if an empirical model in (X , C) is contextual, which extensions
are allowed in a sequence (5.1) and which are not? In other words: at which steps contextuality
really makes its presence? We close this section with a short example.
Example 5.7. Let us take the 5-cycle as the starting scenario:X = {Xi}i=1...5, C = {{Xi,Xi+1}}i=1...5.
This scenario supports a bundle like the one in the Hollow Triangle example, 4.2. We can consider the
coarser scenario with the same measurements and C = {{Xi−1,Xi,Xi+1}}i=1...5 and we see that the
model extends to it. It also extends to the scenario given by C = {{Xi−1,Xi,Xi+1,Xi+2}}i=1...5. The
proof of theorem 5.2 can be applied to other extensions, like here, to say that the empirical model extends to
any scenario in between the cycle and this four-element-context cover. Since no proper subscenario fits in
between this last one and the classical, we can say that it is this step that allows for contextuality.
Other interesting consequences of the notion of subscenarios will be presented elsewhere [18].
6. Connection to other approaches and previous literature
Naturally, the here proposed approach to contextuality is not isolated from other proposals.
The starting point of describing each measurement in each of its contexts has some similarity
with Contextuality by Default (CbD) [19]. The difference appears when we demand the marginal
condition 3.2 to hold, while CbD relax it, in order to be able of treating empirical data which
usually do not obey such condition strictly. Probably the notion of extended contextuality [20] be the
link in between the two approaches, but some interesting notions can come up from the difference
among original contexts and extended ones.
The central rôle played by topology is also present in the (Pre-)Sheaf approach [10], to which
we have already made reference. The notion of extendability and its links to topology had been
discussed previously [21] and we should always mention that the idea of gluing probability
spaces and ask for its (non-)triviality was already present in ref. [22].
All those contemporary notions have some debt with the graph approach to contextuality [23]
and to its variations [24].
7. Discussions and Future Developments
Many points of this approach must be developed elsewhere and also many questions are still
open.
One very natural thing is to consider continuous measurement scenarios. A natural example
comes from spin (or polarisation) measurements on a qbit. There, the Bloch (or Poincaré) sphere
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serve as a parameter space for the measurements of the scenario; however, the measurement
cover would be made of singletons with no transition function defined. Clearly, we need a good
definition of a connection, in order to associate elements of “neighbour” fibres, even when they
do not belong to the same context. A very good geometrical question is: after defining such a
connection, how its curvature relates to contextuality?
A topologically interesting question comes to higher order homology. The first homology
group is deeply connected with the existence of nontrivial cycles10. And nontrivial first homology
groups is sufficient for the existence of nontrivial probability bundles which realise contextual
empirical models, including examples coming from quantum theory. Is it possible to have a
measurement scenario with trivial first homology group, but nontrivial higher order homology
groups, like a sphere, which also support nontrivial probability bundles? Moreover, are those
contextual models obtainable from quantum theory? Or is it true that quantum contextuality
really depends on the non-triviality of the first homology group [25]?
The notion of subscenarios brings with it the idea of covers of a given bundle. Example 5.7
has discussed a collection of different subscenarios, but all with the same topology, except by
the last one, where contextuality shows up. In this sense we identify that “closing the holes” is
the essential step in order to reduce the possibilities of contextuality. The universal cover of a
probability bundle will be deeply related to the notion of extended contextuality and this also
seems to deserve more studies.
Another empty avenue to be travelled comes from the geometry of the simplest example:
the probability simplex of subsec. 2.(b). We see that the marginal condition 3.2 implies some
interesting identifications. Moreover, whenever nontrivial probability bundles appear, the global
picture becomes richer and richer. To have a good description of some examples is a nice target
for the near future.
8. Conclusion
In this paper we introduced a fibre bundle approach to contextuality. Actually, three kinds
of bundles play interesting rôles in this approach: measurable bundles, probability bundles,
and sample bundles. Mathematically, this proposal represents a merging of topological notions
with probability theory. From the viewpoint of contextuality, it is another approach, with many
similarities with the (pre-)sheaf approach, but possibly more comprehensible to many physicists.
Naturally, another approach can allow for new interpretations and new insights. Some interesting
questions were raised in this pages and we believe that their answers will help us figuring out
many interesting aspects of contextuality.
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